Йом Киппур соғысында Израильге АҚШ-тың стратегиялық әуе көлігі

U. S. strategic airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur War

Operation Nickel Grass was the codename for a strategic airlift conducted by the United States to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel during the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. Between 14 October and 14 November of that year, the Military Airlift Command of the United States Air Force shipped approximately 22,325 tons of supplies, including tanks, artillery, and ammunition, in multiple flights of C 141 Starlifters and C 5 Galaxys. This initiative was undertaken to help improve the position of the Israeli military in the face of a large scale joint offensive by Egypt and Syria, both of which had been receiving extensive support from the Soviet Union.

Israel, as well as the U. S. and most of the world, were caught by surprise on 6 October 1973 when Egypt and Syria attacked the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, respectively. On 8 October, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir authorized the assembly of thirteen 20 kiloton nuclear warheads on Jericho missiles and F 4 Phantom II, which were prepared for action against Syrian and Egyptian targets; Kissinger learned of this threatening nuclear escalation on the morning of 9 October. On that same day, Meir issued a personal appeal for military assistance, which European nations declined. Nixon, however, ordered the commencement of Operation Nickel Grass, to replace all of Israel's materiel losses. The decision was taken the same day the Soviets began their own resupply operation of Arab forces by sea. Author Seymour Hersh claimed in 1991 that there was "anecdotal evidence" that Kissinger had told Anwar Sadat that the reason for the U. S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to "going nuclear." In subsequent interviews, however, Kissinger, James Schlesinger and William Quandt, stated that the ongoing Soviet re supply effort and Sadat's early rejection of a ceasefire were the primary motivators, not fears of Israeli use of nuclear weapons.

Initially, only El Al, provided transport, and supplies began to arrive in Israel on 10 October, the same day the first Soviet resupply by air arrived in Damascus. Nonetheless, it was soon clear that El Al's limited supply of ill configured passenger aircraft were insufficient. Still wanting to avoid direct U. S. involvement, starting 10 October, the use of commercial carriers was explored to provide 10–20 flights a day. On 12 October, Nixon decided that no more delays could be allowed, and ordered the USAF to "send everything that can fly." Within nine hours, C 141s and C 5s were en route to Israel. The political maneuvering was not immediately solved by the USAF's participation however: traditional European allies refused to allow re supply aircraft to land for refueling or even overfly their territory. Portugal seemed willing to help though, so aircraft were dispatched to Lajes Field in the Azores Islands. After a few hours in the air, word came through that Portugal would permit them to land, and Lajes became a key staging point for the rest of the airlift. Strategic Air Command (SAC) Boeing KC 135 Stratotankers were the first to arrive at Lajes Air Base. The KC 135s had left Pease AFB, New Hampshire, the night of Saturday, 13 October (one of the bases El Al was using to re supply the war effort); the tankers were ferrying factory fresh Douglas A 4 Skyhawk and F 4 Phantom II aircraft flying non stop from the factory in St. Louis, Missouri to Ben Gurion Airport. To comply with the demands of other European nations, even U. S. supplies already stationed in Europe were routed through Lajes and soon over thirty aircraft per day were moving through Lajes. To accommodate this, the base grew to house an extra 1,300 people who were billeted in improvised housing and hastily reactivated World War II barracks, rooms that would normally accommodate one or two enlisted men were expanded to four (2 bunk beds). Between the Azores and Israel, the aircraft had to follow an extremely precise route. Flying exactly along the airspace border between hostile Arab nations to the south and European nations to the north, the transport craft flew down the middle of the Mediterranean Sea to Israel. Consequently, at least 100 F 4 Phantom II fighters were sent to Israel under Nickel Grass, coming from the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing and the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing. They were flown to Lod, where American pilots were swapped for their Israeli counterparts. After the replacement of USAF insignia with IAF insignia if needed, the planes were refueled and ordered to the front, often taking to the air within hours of having arrived. Some aircraft came directly from the USAFE fleet and operated in USAF camouflage, Twelve C 130E Hercules transports were also transferred to Israel, the first of the type to be delivered to the IAF. When the third cease fire resolution was finally implemented on October 24, the airlift immediately slowed. Further flights were made to rebuild Israeli forces to their pre war strength and Operation Nickel Grass was ended on 14 November. In the end, the military airlift shipped 22,325 tons of materiel to Israel. Additionally, the U. S. conducted its own seaborne re supply operation, delivering 33,210 tons to Israel by 30 October. During the same general time, the Soviets airlifted 12,500–15,000 tons of supplies, more than half of which went to Syria; they also supplied another 63,000 tons mainly to Syria by means of a sealift.

Operation Nickel Grass had immediate and far reaching effects. Arab members of OPEC had declared they would limit or stop oil shipments to the U. S. and other countries if they supported Israel in the conflict. Holding to their threats, the Arab states declared a complete oil embargo on the U. S Oil prices skyrocketed, fuel became scarce and the U. S. was soon embroiled in the 1973 oil crisis. Nickel Grass also revealed a severe deficiency in American airlift capabilities: the need for staging bases overseas. Without Portugal's assistance, the airlift might not even have been possible. As a result, the U. S. greatly expanded its aerial refueling capabilities and made long distance flight operations the standard rather than the exception. Nickel Grass vindicated the USAF decision to purchase the C 5 Galaxy. Since its introduction in 1970, the C 5 had been plagued by problems. The USAF claimed to have rectified the problems, but the C 5 was still viewed by the press as an expensive failure. During Nickel Grass, C 5s carried 48% of the total cargo in only 145 of the 567 total missions. The C 5 also carried "outsize" cargo such as M60 Patton tanks, M109 howitzers, ground radar systems, mobile tractor units, CH 53 Sea Stallion helicopters and A 4 Skyhawk components, cargo that could not fit in smaller aircraft. This performance justified the C 5's existence.