Ортақ пайдалану ресурстары: Менеджмент және үдерістері

Type of good
In economics, a common pool resource (CPR) is a type of good consisting of a natural or human made resource system (e. g. an irrigation system or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. Unlike pure public goods, common pool resources face problems of congestion or overuse, because they are subtractable. A common pool resource typically consists of a core resource (e. g. water or fish), which defines the stock variable, while providing a limited quantity of extractable fringe units, which defines the flow variable. While the core resource is to be protected or nurtured in order to allow for its continuous exploitation, the fringe units can be harvested or consumed.

A new proposal of the management of CPR is to develop autonomous organizations that are not completely privatized and controlled by government power, which led and supervised by the community to manage common pool resources in addition to directly through the government and the free market. There are many factors that may affect the formation and development of these kinds of autonomous organizations. In general, there are four variables that are very important for local common pool resource management: (1) characteristics of the resource; (2) characteristics of the resource dependent group; (3) institutional model of resource management; (4) the relationship between groups, external forces, and authorities.

Common Pool Resource (CPR) games have been a focal point in experimental research, providing insights into the dynamics and dilemmas associated with communal resource management. A foundational work introduced a conceptual framework that elucidates the strategic content of CPR dilemmas, demonstrating how theoretical constructs, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games, apply to these behavioral challenges. Further, field experiments involving specific ecological features of CPRs, such as water irrigation, forestry, and fisheries, have revealed the impact of various resource specific dynamics on collective action and resource management. Additionally, a study explored the external validity of CPR laboratory experiments within the context of artisanal benthic fisheries in Chile, revealing a correlation between cooperative behaviors exhibited in laboratory settings and those in real world co managed and open access fisheries. These studies collectively underscore the complexity of CPR dilemmas and highlight the nuanced interplay between individual strategies, collective action, and resource sustainability, providing a multifaceted understanding of cooperation and norm internalization in the management of communal resources.

In economics, open access resources are, for the most part, rivalrous, non excludable goods. This makes them similar to common goods during times of prosperity. Unlike many common goods, open access goods require little oversight or may be difficult to restrict access. Two possibilities may follow: a common property or an open access system. However, in a different setting, such as fishing, there will be drastically different consequences. Since fish are an open access resource, it is relatively simple to fish and profit. If fishing becomes profitable, there will be more fishers and fewer fish. Fewer fish lead to higher prices which will lead again to more fishers, as well as lower reproduction of fish. This is a negative externality and an example of problems that arise with open access goods.