Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem

Result in mechanism design and economics of asymmetric information
The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem is an important result in mechanism design and the economics of asymmetric information, and named for Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite. Informally, the result says that there is no efficient way for two parties to trade a good when they each have secret and probabilistically varying valuations for it, without the risk of forcing one party to trade at a loss. The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem is among the most remarkable and universally applicable negative results in economics—a kind of negative mirror to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. It is, however, much less famous than those results or Arrow's earlier result on the impossibility of satisfactory electoral systems.

Various variants of the Myerson–Satterthwaite setting have been studied. 1. Myerson and Satterthwaite considered a single buyer and a single seller. When there are many buyers and sellers, the inefficiency asymptotically disappears. However, this is only true in the case of private goods; in the case of public goods the inefficiency is aggravated when the number of agents becomes large. 2. Myerson and Satterthwaite considered an asymmetric initial situation, in the sense that at the outset one party has 100% of the good and the other party has 0% of the good. It has been shown that ex post efficiency can be attained if initially both parties own 50% of the good to be traded. 3. The latter result has been extended to settings in which the parties can make unobservable ex ante investments in order to increase their own valuations. Yet, ex post efficiency cannot be achieved if the seller's unobservable investment increases the buyer's valuation, even if only the buyer has private information about his or her valuation. 4. Another impossibility result where only one party has private information about its valuation can be shown to hold when the outside option payoffs are not exogenously given.