Саламин шайқасы және Грекияны қорғау жолындағы жеңіс

Battle that decisively ended Xerxes's invasion of Greece (479 BC)
Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece. However, he died before the invasion could begin. The throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I, who quickly resumed the preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water as a gesture of their submission, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta (both of whom were at open war with Persia). Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city states was formed (hereafter referred to as 'the Allies'). This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city states in attendance were still technically at war with each other. The Allies initially adopted a strategy of blocking the land and sea approaches to southern Greece. Thus, in August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the vastly outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by a mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard, formed of the Spartan and Thespian contingents, was surrounded and annihilated. The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium, consisting of a series of naval encounters, was up to that point a stalemate; however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army had proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae, before taking possession of the now evacuated city of Athens. The allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely the allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnese. The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at the Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with, according to Herodotus at least, the majority of the army. Herodotus suggests that this was because he feared the Greeks would sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges, thereby trapping his army in Europe. He thus left Mardonius, with handpicked troops, to complete the conquest of Greece the following year. Mardonius evacuated Attica, and wintered in Thessaly; the Athenians then reoccupied their destroyed city. The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was also on hand to hear the offer, and rejected it: <blockquote> The degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it. But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender. According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered. When the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans the next day, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already en route; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians. The Greek city state alliance, which included the Spartan and Athenian armies, then proceeded northward toward the Persian army led by Mardonius, with the two forces ultimately facing each other in the Battle of Plataea. Meanwhile, the Athenian navy under Xanthippus joined with the Allied fleet off Delos. They were then approached by a delegation from Samos, who suggested that the Ionian cities would revolt if the Allied fleet successfully engaged the Persian fleet. They furthermore pointed out the poor morale and reduced seaworthiness of the Persian fleet.

When the Persians heard that the Allied fleet was approaching, they set sail from Samos towards the Ionian mainland. According to Herodotus, this was because they had decided in council that they could not beat the Allies in a naval battle. Finding the Persian fleet gone from Samos, the Allies were thrown into uncertainty. Eventually they resolved that they would sail to the mainland, and equipped themselves for a naval battle. However, when the Allies approached Mycale, the Persians did not attempt to engage them, and remained guarding their camp. Leotychides therefore sailed as close to the camp as possible, and had a herald make an appeal to the Ionians:<blockquote> "Men of Ionia, you who hear us, understand what I say, for by no means will the Persians understand anything I charge you with when we join battle; first of all it is right for each man to remember his freedom and next the battle cry Hebe: and let him who hears me tell him who has not heard it." The Persians, guessing that their Samian contingent would support the allies, took away their armour. Herodotus reports that as the Allies approached the Persian camp, rumour spread amongst them of an Allied victory at Plataea; Diodorus also claims that Leotychides informed the Allies of victory at Plataea before the battle began. Their morale boosted by this omen, they set forth to win their own victory. This would explain the rumour of victory and near simultaneous attack, but is only one possible theory. the Greeks had 378 at Salamis, but must have suffered significant losses, and so they probably also had around 300 in total (though not necessarily all these ships formed part of the allied fleet for 479 BC). while Herodotus suggests that there were 60,000 men in the army under the command of Tigranes. it is improbable that such a large camp could have been built at Mycale in the time frame that Herodotus suggests. It is therefore possible that the 60,000 quoted by Herodotus is actually the total number of Persians present at Mycale; the Persians certainly outnumbered the Allies, emerging from the palisade in confidence after seeing the smaller number of the Allied troops. The Persian force of 60,000 most likely consisted of spearmen and archers from the various contingents of Persians, Medes, and Red Sea Islanders, though a small force of Persian cavalry was also recruited into the army. In addition to the Persians, Medes, and Red Sea Islanders, there were also some contingents of Greek mercenaries in the Persian army at Mycale, but Herodotus wrote that these later defected over to the Greeks during the main battle outside the Persian camp of Mount Mycale.

Numbers of ships and men for the Allies are also somewhat problematic. Herodotus claims that Leotychides had 110 triremes under his command. However, the previous year, the allies had fielded 271 triremes at the Battle of Artemisium, and then 378 at the Battle of Salamis. We are also told that the Allies had "command of the sea" after Salamis, which implies that they could at least equal the Persian fleet. Diodorus, on the other hand, tells us the allies had 250 ships, which is more consistent with their force levels of the previous year. they would still have had ample manpower to man a large fleet of triremes, especially since rowers tended to be of the lower classes (the thetes) who could not afford the equipment to fight as hoplites. The standard complement of a trireme was 200 men, including 14 marines. In the second Persian invasion of Greece, each Persian ship had carried thirty extra marines, and this was probably also true in the first invasion when the whole invasion force was apparently carried in triremes. Combining these numbers yields a range of 22,000–58,000 men for the Allies, with 3,300–11,250 more heavily armoured marines. However, since only the marines were expected to fight hand to hand, the rowers in the Allied fleet were probably not equipped to fight in a land battle; it is likely therefore that it was only the marines who contested the battle. sought to press home their morale advantage once they were informed of the state of the Persian fleet. However, whether because of their low morale, or because they were in fact outnumbered, the Persians sought instead the tactical advantage of joining up with the army under Tigranes, and fortifying a position.

The Allies seem to have formed into two wings; on the right were the Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians and Troezenians, and on the left were the Spartans with other contingents. The right wing marched across level ground straight towards the Persian camp, whilst the left wing attempted to outflank the Persians by passing through more broken ground. Herodotus tells us that, on seeing the outcome of the battle hung in the balance, the disarmed Samians had joined in on the side of the allies, doing what they could. Herodotus does not mention specific figures for casualties, merely saying that losses were heavy on both sides. Diodorus claims that there were 40,000 Persian casualties, and also suggests that the survivors made their way to Sardis. Returning to Samos they then discussed their next moves. After the victory at Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this was already done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians. Herodotus ended his Histories after the siege of Sestos. Over the next 30 years, the Greeks, primarily the Athenian dominated Delian League, would expel (or help expel) the Persians from Macedon, Thrace, the Aegean islands and Ionia. Marathon and Salamis perhaps because they were both fought against the odds, and in dire strategic situations. Conversely, the Battles of Plataea and Mycale were both fought from a relative position of Greek strength, and against lesser odds; perhaps the Greeks were even expecting to win and had certainly seen the opportunity to deal the final blow. Militarily, the major lesson of both Mycale and Plataea (since both were fought on land) was the repeated confirmation of the superiority of the hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been demonstrated at Marathon. Taking on this lesson, after the Greco Persian Wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries.

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