1962-1999 жылдардағы Алжир тарихы

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The History of Algeria from 1962 to 1999 includes the period starting with preparations for independence and the aftermath of the independence war with France in the 1960s to the Civil War and the 1999 presidential election.

In preparation for independence, the CNRA (Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne) had met in Tripoli in May 1962 to work out a plan for the FLN's (Front de Libération Nationale) transition from a liberation movement to a political party. The Tripoli Program called for land reform, the large scale nationalization of industry and services, and a strong commitment to nonalignment and anti colonialism in foreign relations. The platform also envisioned the FLN as a mass organization broad enough to encompass all nationalist groups. Adoption of the Tripoli Program notwithstanding, deep personal and ideological divisions surfaced within the FLN as the war drew to a close and the date for independence approached. Competition and confrontation among various factions not only deprived the FLN of a leadership that spoke with a single voice, but also almost resulted in full scale civil war. According to historian John Ruedy, these factions, or "clans" did not embody "family or regional loyalties, as in the Arab East, because the generations long detribalization of Algeria had been too thorough. Rather, they represented relationships based on school, wartime or other networking." The Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) commanders and the GPRA (Gouvernement Provisionel de la République Algérienne) struggled for power, including an unsuccessful attempt to dismiss Colonel Houari Boumédiènne, chief of staff of the ALN in Morocco. Boumédiènne formed an alliance with Ahmed Ben Bella, who together with Mohamed Khider and Rabah Bitat, announced the formation of the Political Bureau (Bureau Politique) as a rival government to the GPRA, which had installed itself in Algiers as the "Provisional Executive". Boumédiènne's forces entered Algiers in September, where he was joined by Ben Bella, who quickly consolidated his power. Ben Bella purged his political opponents from the single slate of candidates for the forthcoming Algerian National Assembly elections. However, underlying opposition to the Political Bureau and to the absence of alternative candidates was manifested in an 18 percent abstention rate nationwide that rose to 36 percent of the electorate in Algiers. The creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria was formally proclaimed at the opening session of the National Assembly on September 25, 1962. Ferhat Abbas, a moderate unconnected with the Political Bureau, who had previously headed the GPRA, was elected president of the assembly by the delegates, and Ben Bella was named prime minister. On the following day, Ben Bella formed a cabinet that was representative of the Political Bureau but that also included Boumédiènne as defense minister as well as other members of the so called Oujda Group, who had served under him with the external forces in Morocco. Ben Bella, Boumédiènne, and Khider initially formed a triumvirate linking the leadership of the three power bases — the army, the party, and the government, respectively. However, Ben Bella's ambitions and authoritarian tendencies were to lead the triumvirate to unravel and provoke increasing discontent among Algerians.

The war of national liberation and its aftermath severely disrupted Algeria's society and economy. In addition to the physical destruction, the exodus of the colons deprived the country of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, physicians, and skilled workers — all occupations which colonial policy had prevented or discouraged the Muslim population from pursuing. The homeless and displaced numbered in the hundreds of thousands, many suffering from illness, and some 70 percent of the workforce unemployed. Distribution of goods was at a standstill. Departing colons destroyed or carried off public records and utility plans, leaving public services in shambles. So, not only were the Algerian countryside and infrastructure destroyed, but also, almost half the rural population was forcibly displaced. Algerians now faced the task of replacing the colonial administration, which had been run by European settlers who left en masse after independence in 1962. Staffing these positions was especially difficult due to the fact that 86% of Algerians were illiterate in 1954. In 1962, the year of independence, not many Algerians had a university education, and although the number of university graduates increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it was still not enough to avoid certain political and social consequences. Given the low number of educated Algerians in 1962, the few university graduates had to carry the burden of helping rebuild a country following years of colonial occupation. They had to attempt to come up with solutions to issues like access to healthcare, transportation, and the eradication of illiteracy. Another challenge the newly sovereign Algerian government faced in the aftermath of the war was resettling the millions of displaced Algerians, both within Algeria's borders and outside of them. When neighboring countries Tunisia and Morocco became independent in 1956 (two years after the Algerian war for independence began), many Algerians fled to them to escape the violence within their borders. Later in the war, when the French army began to create 'forbidden zones' in the mountainous regions of the country, the number of Algerians fleeing their home country sharply increased, as they sought to avoid being sent to regroupment camps (camp de regroupement.) While before the end of the war, the FLN struggled to exercise sovereignty within Algerian borders, it found diplomatic strength in interacting with international organizations dealing with refugees, most notably the UNHCR. In claiming responsibility for the Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, the FLN assumed state like responsibilities. In tandem, through accepting Algerian refugees, newly independent Morocco and Tunisia were able to assert their "new found sovereignty in the international sphere." The work of historians varies considerably between the colonial and post colonial periods of Algerian history. This is both in quantity since less historians study post 1962 Algeria and quality, as research on this period is typically not carried out by experienced academics. Various factors contribute to this lack of historiography, as history for the years following 1962 is often difficult to research. This is due to several aspects of post independence Algeria. One such feature is state propaganda. The Front de Libération nationale (FLN) shaped the national narrative in Algeria as a way of anchoring its legitimacy. This narrative encouraged the adoption of the morals and attitudes of the FLN, and was assimilated into official texts, such as the 1963, 1976, and 1989 constitutions. The FLN also excluded its opposing political forces from this imposed narrative. Their determination to control the rendering of events influenced the questions which historians could ask, as well as the material available to them. As a result, it contributed to the lack of historiography on post 1962 Algeria. Another reason for the insufficient literature on Algeria following independence is the destruction of documents. Following 1962, archives became very difficult to access, as the national archives on Algerian territory were no longer created by the French colonial administration, but by the newly independent state. This resulted in a switch from a period with a relative abundance of sources to one with nearly no national archives. It had a large effect on the experience of historians when writing works on this period. Also, while the state archives of the colonial period are available in Algeria and France to a certain extent, the Algerian National Archives never gave access to state archives for the independence period, once again creating disparities between the studies of the different periods. Another barrier in the study of post independence documents is Arabization. Nowadays, whereas most of the relevant archives are in French, history students are typically Arabophones. There was also a gap between university students and their professors, who preferred writing in French, which affected their ability to instruct their students on the necessary skills for studying contemporary history. Also, although there is an international academic community that studies colonial Algeria, there is no such group for independent Algeria. The difficulty in accessing written sources made witness stories more important when it came to researching contemporary Algerian history. This was not helped by the hesitation of most witnesses to recount their experiences, however, which also played a role in limiting the historiography of post 1962 Algeria. The accounts of witnesses were reported to have become more unsure once the threshold of 1962 was passed, once again hinting at the overshadowing of more contemporary Algerian history by its colonial past. Moreover, some interviewees expressed regional points of view on the war of independence, ignoring both the post 1962 period and certain regions of Algeria. Some historians have also remarked that “after 1962, the past is not history,” diminishing the importance of that time. Although recollections of this period are starting to become more willingly shared, it is still difficult to find evidence to support the memories of its witnesses. The FLN’s ‘memorial context of post independence Algeria’ even impacted historians’ ability to locate witnesses of pre independence Algeria and its political events, and it also explains why witnesses were often so hesitant to tell stories of post 1962 Algeria for fear of contradicting the FLN imposed narrative. Therefore, many historians working on the history of Algeria view 1962 as ‘the end of history.’ This is also the case with actors of that period, who, for a long time after independence was achieved, did not speak of their experiences.