Мақсатты әрекет: Философиялық талдау

Event done by an agent for a purpose

In philosophy, an action is an event that an agent performs for a purpose, that is, guided by the person's intention. The first question in the philosophy of action is to determine how actions differ from other forms of behavior, like involuntary reflexes. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, it involves discovering "[w]hat is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm". There is broad agreement that the answer to this question has to do with the agent's intentions. So driving a car is an action since the agent intends to do so, but sneezing is a mere behavior since it happens independent of the agent's intention. The dominant theory of the relation between the intention and the behavior is causalism: Because of its reliance on psychological states and causal relations, this position is considered to be a Humean theory of action. According to Davidson, it is not just the bodily behavior that counts as the action but also the consequences that follow from it. So the movement of the finger flipping the switch is part of the action as well as the electrons moving through the wire and the light bulb turning on. Some consequences are included in the action even though the agent did not intend them to happen. One difficulty with theories of action that try to characterize actions in terms of causal relations between mental states and bodily movements, so called causalist theories, is what has been referred to as wayward causal chains. Davidson addresses this issue by excluding cases of wayward causation from his account since they are not examples of intentional behavior in the strict sense. So bodily behavior only constitutes an action if it was caused by intentions in the right way. One important objection to Davidson's theory of actions is that it does not account for the agent's role in the production of action. This role could include reflecting on what to do, choosing an alternative and then carrying it out. Volitions and tryings are forms of affirming something, like intentions. They can be distinguished from intentions because they are directed at executing a course of action in the here and now, in contrast to intentions, which involve future directed plans to do something later. But it has been argued that they can be treated as a unified notion since there is no important difference between the two for the theory of action because they play the same explanatory role. This role includes both the experiential level, But even in an unsuccessful case there is still something: it is different from not trying at all. One way to avoid this objection is to hold that volitions constitute bodily movements, i. e. are an aspect of them, instead of causing them.

Non causalist or anti causalist theories deny that intentions or similar states cause actions. They thereby oppose causalist theories like Davidson's account or standard forms of volitionalism. They usually agree that intentions are essential to actions. This brings with it the difficulty of accounting for the relation between intentions and actions in a non causal way. One problem with this approach is that the two forms of causation do not have to be incompatible. Few theorists deny that actions are teleological in the sense of being goal oriented. But the representation of a goal in the agent's mind may act as an efficient cause at the same time. Important among them are arguments from wayward causation: that behavior only constitutes an action if it was caused by an intention in the right way, not in any way. This critique focuses on difficulties causalists have faced in explicitly formulating how to distinguish between proper and wayward causation. As he points out, we usually have many different reasons for performing the same action. But when we perform it, we often perform it for one reason but not for another. In this example, the flipping of the switch is more basic than the turning on of the light. But the turning on of the light can itself constitute another action, like the action of alerting the burglar. It is usually held that the chain or hierarchy of actions composed this way has a fundamental level at which it stops. According to this view, the events of imagining, judging or remembering are not mental actions strictly speaking but they can be the products of mental actions.

Deliberations and decisions are relevant for actions since they frequently precede the action. It is often the case that several courses of action are open to the agent.

Explanations can be characterized as answers to why questions. Explanations of actions are concerned with why the agent performed the action. The most straightforward answer to this question cites the agent's desire. For example, John went to the fridge because he had a desire for ice cream. The agent's beliefs are another relevant feature for action explanation. For example, John's action of going to the fridge would be considered irrational if his reason for this is bad, e. g. because his belief that there is ice cream in the fridge is merely based on wishful thinking.

The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do. But in one sense the problem of responsibility is wider since we can be responsible not just for doing something but for failing to do something, so called omissions. The agent's intentions are also relevant for responsibility, but we can be responsible for things we did not intend. For example, a chain smoker may have a negative impact on the health of the people around him. This is a side effect of his smoking that is not part of his intention. The smoker may still be responsible for this damage, either because he was aware of this side effect and decided to ignore it or because he should have been aware of it, so called negligence.

In enactivism theory, perception is understood to be sensorimotor in nature. That is, we carry out actions as an essential part of perceiving the world. Alva Noë states:
'We move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us [we]: crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses or draw near to get a better look ' 'Perception is a mode of activity on the part of the whole animal It cannot be represented in terms of merely passive, and internal, processes '

Some philosophers (e. g. Donald Davidson) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are physical states that cause the action. Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduced to mere physical causes. Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work. If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent. Those who hold the belief that mental properties are reducible to physical properties are known as token identity reductionists. Some have disagreed with the conclusion that this reduction means the mental explanations are causally impotent while still maintaining that the reduction is possible. For example, Dretske has put forward the viewpoint of reasons as structuring causes. Such individuals suggest that mental states are epiphenomenal, in that they have no impact on physical states, but are nonetheless distinct entities (see epiphenomenalism).