Введение
Британский философ-прагматик немецкого происхождения Шиллер также опубликовал три книги по евгенике: «Тантал или будущее человека» (1924), «Евгеника и политика» (1926) и «Социальный распад и евгеническая реформа» (1932).
Schiller also published three books on the subject of eugenics; Tantalus or the Future of Man (1924), Eugenics and Politics (1926), and Social Decay and Eugenic Reform (1932).
Противостояние натурализму и метафизике
В "Загадках" Шиллер приводит исторические примеры опасностей абстрактной метафизики в философии Платона, Зенона и Гегеля, изображая Гегеля как худшего нарушителя: "Гегелианство никогда и нигде не соприкасается с фактом или реальностью. И причина проста: нельзя, не заплатив за это, заменять реальность абстракциями; мысленный символ не может выполнять функцию обозначенного им объекта". Шиллер утверждал, что недостаток системы Гегеля, как и всех систем абстрактной метафизики, заключается в том, что созданный ею мир всегда оказывается бесполезным для руководства нашей несовершенной, изменчивой, конкретной и физической жизнью в достижении "высших" универсальных идеалов и целей. Например, Шиллер утверждает, что реальность времени и изменений принципиально противоречит самому способу работы всех систем абстрактной метафизики. Он говорит, что возможность изменения является предпосылкой любого морального действия (или действия вообще), и поэтому любая система абстрактной метафизики неизбежно приводит нас к моральному скептицизму. Проблема заключается в стремлении абстрактной метафизики "интерпретировать мир в терминах концепций, которые должны быть истинными не здесь и сейчас, а "вечно" и независимо от времени и изменений". В результате метафизика вынуждена использовать концепции, из которых абстрагирован "временной аспект Реальности". Разумеется, "как только абстрагировавшись от" времени, его уже невозможно восстановить, точно так же, как невозможно вывести индивидуальность Реальности, однажды ее проигнорировав. Предполагается, что для выражения "истины" о Реальности, ее "сущности", индивидуальности, изменения и погруженности в определенную временную и пространственную среду можно пренебречь, и вневременная валидность концепции таким образом заменяет живое, изменяющееся и преходящее существование, которое мы созерцаем. Я хочу лишь указать на то, что неразумно ожидать от таких посылок дедуктивного обоснования тех самых характеристик Реальности, которые были исключены. Истинная причина, по которой гегельянство не может дать объяснения временному процессу, то есть тому факту, что мир находится "во времени" и непрерывно меняется, заключается в том, что оно было построено для описания мира независимо от времени и изменений. Если вы настаиваете на системе вечной и неизменной "истины", вы можете получить ее только путем абстрагирования от тех характеристик реальности, которые мы пытаемся выразить терминами индивидуальность, время и изменение. Но вы должны заплатить цену за формулу, позволяющую вам делать утверждения, справедливые далеко за пределами границ вашего опыта. И часть этой цены заключается в том, что вы в конечном итоге не сможете дать рациональное объяснение тем самым характеристикам, которые вы изначально отклонили как не относящиеся к рациональному объяснению. В то время как абстрактная метафизика предоставляет нам мир красоты и цели, а также различные другие "высшие" ценности, она объявляет другие ключевые аспекты мира, в котором мы живем, иллюзорными. В мире абстрактной метафизики нет места несовершенным моральным агентам, которые (1) стремятся познать мир, а затем (2) действуют, чтобы изменить его к лучшему. Следовательно, абстрактная метафизика объявляет нас иллюзорными и признает наше место в мире несущественным и бессмысленным. Когда абстракции становятся приоритетными, наша конкретная жизнь рушится в скептицизм и пессимизм. Он также критикует альтернативный натуралистический метод, утверждая, что он также приводит к эпистемологическому и моральному скептицизму. Шиллер пытается показать несостоятельность этого метода в переходе от холодного, безжизненного низшего мира атомов к высшему миру этики, смыслов и разума. Как и в случае с абстрактной метафизикой, Шиллер атакует натурализм по многим направлениям: (1) натуралистический метод не способен свести универсалии к частностям, (2) натуралистический метод не способен свести свободу воли к детерминированным движениям, (3) натуралистический метод не способен свести эмерджентные свойства, такие как сознание, к активности мозга, (4) натуралистический метод не способен свести Бога к пантеизму и так далее. Подобно тому, как абстрактный метод не может найти место для низших элементов нашего мира в высшем, натуралистический метод не может найти место для высших элементов нашего мира в низшем. В противоположность абстрактной метафизике, натурализм отрицает реальность высших элементов, чтобы спасти низшие. Шиллер использует здесь термин "псевдометафизический" вместо натурализма – как он иногда делает – потому что он обвиняет этих натуралистических философов в попытке решить метафизические проблемы, придерживаясь неметафизических "низших" аспектов мира (то есть, не прибегая к настоящей метафизике):
the reference to Time could not, of course, be recovered, any more than the individuality of Reality can be deduced, when once ignored. The assumption is made that, to express the 'truth' about Reality, its 'thisness,' individuality, change and its immersion in a certain temporal and spatial environment may be neglected, and the timeless validity of a conception is thus substituted for the living, changing and perishing existence we contemplate. What I wish here to point out is merely that it is unreasonable to expect from such premises to arrive at a deductive justification of the very characteristics of Reality that have been excluded. The true reason, then, why Hegelism can give no reason for the Time process, i. e. for the fact that the world is 'in time,' and changes continuously, is that it was constructed to give an account of the world irrespective of time and change. If you insist on having a system of eternal and immutable 'truth,' you can get it only by abstracting from those characteristics of reality, which we try to express by the terms individuality, time, and change. But you must pay the price for a formula that will enable you to make assertions that hold good far beyond the limits of your experience. And it is part of the price that you will in the end be unable to give a rational explanation of those very characteristics, which you dismissed at the outset as irrelevant to a rational explanation. While abstract metaphysics provides us with a world of beauty and purpose and various other "highers", it condemns other key aspects of the world we live in as imaginary. The world of abstract metaphysics has no place for imperfect moral agents who (1) strive to learn about the world and then (2) act upon the world to change it for the better. Consequently, abstract metaphysics condemns us as illusionary, and declares our place in the world as unimportant and purposeless. Where abstractions take priority, our concrete lives collapse into scepticism and pessimism. He also makes a case against the alternative naturalist method, saying that this too results in an epistemological and moral scepticism. Schiller looks to show this method's inadequacy at moving from the cold, lifeless lower world of atoms to the higher world of ethics, meanings, and minds. As with abstract metaphysics, Schiller attacks naturalism on many fronts: (1) the naturalist method is unable to reduce universals to particulars, (2) the naturalist method is unable to reduce freewill to determinist movements, (3) the naturalist method is unable to reduce emergent properties like consciousness to brain activity, (4) the naturalist method is unable to reduce God into a pantheism, and so on. Just as the abstract method cannot find a place for the lower elements of our world inside the higher, the naturalist method cannot find a place for the higher elements of our world inside the lower. In a reversal of abstract metaphysics, naturalism denies the reality of the higher elements to save the lower. Schiller uses the term "pseudo metaphysical" here instead of naturalism—as he sometimes does—because he is accusing these naturalist philosophers of trying to solve metaphysical problems while sticking to the non metaphysical "lower" aspects of the world (i. e. without engaging in real metaphysics):
The pseudo metaphysical method puts forward the method of science as the method of philosophy. But it is doomed to perpetual failure. [T]he data supplied by the physical sciences are intractable, because they are data of a lower sort than the facts they are to explain. The objects of the physical sciences form the lower orders in the hierarchy of existence, more extensive but less significant. Thus the atoms of the physicist may indeed be found in the organisation of conscious beings, but they are subordinate: a living organism exhibits actions which cannot be formulated by the laws of physics alone; man is material, but he is also a great deal more. To show that the world's higher elements do not reduce to the lower is not yet to show that naturalism must condemn the world's higher elements as illusionary. A second component to Schiller's attack is showing that naturalism cannot escape its inability to reduce the higher to the lower by asserting that these higher elements evolve from the lower. However, Schiller does not see naturalism as any more capable of explaining the evolution of the higher from the lower than it is capable of reducing the higher to the lower. While evolution does begin with something lower that in turn evolves into something higher, the problem for naturalism is that whatever the starting point for evolution is, it must first be something with the potential to evolve into a higher. For example, the world cannot come into existence from nothing because the potential or "germ" of the world is not "in" nothing (nothing has no potential, it has nothing; after all, it is nothing). Likewise, biological evolution cannot begin from inanimate matter, because the potential for life is not "in" inanimate matter. The following passage shows Schiller applying the same sort of reasoning to the evolution of consciousness:
Taken as the type of the pseudo metaphysical method, which explains the higher by the lower it does not explain the genesis of consciousness out of unconscious matter, because we cannot, or do not, attribute potential consciousness to matter. the theory of Evolution derives the [end result] from its germ, i. e., from that which was, what it became, potentially. Unable to either reduce or explain the evolution of the higher elements of our world, naturalism is left to explain away the higher elements as mere illusions. In doing this, naturalism condemns us to scepticism in both epistemology and ethics. It is worth noting, that while Schiller's work has been largely neglected since his death, Schiller's arguments against a naturalistic account of evolution have been recently cited by advocates of intelligent design to establish the existence of a longer history for the view due to legal concerns in the United States (See: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District).
Псевдометафизический метод представляет метод науки как метод философии. Но он обречен на вечный провал. [Д]анные, предоставляемые физическими науками, неуправляемы, поскольку они являются данными более низкого порядка, чем факты, которые они должны объяснять. Объекты физических наук образуют более низкие уровни в иерархии существования, более обширные, но менее значимые. Таким образом, атомы физика действительно могут быть найдены в организации сознательных существ, но они подчинены: живой организм проявляет действия, которые не могут быть сформулированы только законами физики; человек материален, но он гораздо больше, чем просто материал. Показать, что высшие элементы мира не сводятся к низшим, еще не значит показать, что натурализм должен объявлять высшие элементы мира иллюзорными. Вторая составляющая атаки Шиллера заключается в демонстрации того, что натурализм не может избежать своей неспособности свести высшее к низшему, утверждая, что эти высшие элементы эволюционируют из низших. Однако Шиллер не считает натурализм более способным объяснить эволюцию высшего из низшего, чем он способен свести высшее к низшему. Хотя эволюция действительно начинается с чего-то низшего, что, в свою очередь, эволюционирует во что-то высшее, проблема для натурализма заключается в том, что что бы ни было отправной точкой эволюции, это должно быть нечто, имеющее потенциал эволюционировать в высшее. Например, мир не может возникнуть из ничего, потому что потенциал или "зародыш" мира не "в" небытии (ничто не имеет потенциала, у него нет ничего; в конце концов, это ничто). Точно так же биологическая эволюция не может начаться с неодушевленной материи, потому что потенциал для жизни не "в" неодушевленной материи. Следующий отрывок показывает, как Шиллер применяет тот же тип рассуждений к эволюции сознания:
the reference to Time could not, of course, be recovered, any more than the individuality of Reality can be deduced, when once ignored. The assumption is made that, to express the 'truth' about Reality, its 'thisness,' individuality, change and its immersion in a certain temporal and spatial environment may be neglected, and the timeless validity of a conception is thus substituted for the living, changing and perishing existence we contemplate. What I wish here to point out is merely that it is unreasonable to expect from such premises to arrive at a deductive justification of the very characteristics of Reality that have been excluded. The true reason, then, why Hegelism can give no reason for the Time process, i. e. for the fact that the world is 'in time,' and changes continuously, is that it was constructed to give an account of the world irrespective of time and change. If you insist on having a system of eternal and immutable 'truth,' you can get it only by abstracting from those characteristics of reality, which we try to express by the terms individuality, time, and change. But you must pay the price for a formula that will enable you to make assertions that hold good far beyond the limits of your experience. And it is part of the price that you will in the end be unable to give a rational explanation of those very characteristics, which you dismissed at the outset as irrelevant to a rational explanation. While abstract metaphysics provides us with a world of beauty and purpose and various other "highers", it condemns other key aspects of the world we live in as imaginary. The world of abstract metaphysics has no place for imperfect moral agents who (1) strive to learn about the world and then (2) act upon the world to change it for the better. Consequently, abstract metaphysics condemns us as illusionary, and declares our place in the world as unimportant and purposeless. Where abstractions take priority, our concrete lives collapse into scepticism and pessimism. He also makes a case against the alternative naturalist method, saying that this too results in an epistemological and moral scepticism. Schiller looks to show this method's inadequacy at moving from the cold, lifeless lower world of atoms to the higher world of ethics, meanings, and minds. As with abstract metaphysics, Schiller attacks naturalism on many fronts: (1) the naturalist method is unable to reduce universals to particulars, (2) the naturalist method is unable to reduce freewill to determinist movements, (3) the naturalist method is unable to reduce emergent properties like consciousness to brain activity, (4) the naturalist method is unable to reduce God into a pantheism, and so on. Just as the abstract method cannot find a place for the lower elements of our world inside the higher, the naturalist method cannot find a place for the higher elements of our world inside the lower. In a reversal of abstract metaphysics, naturalism denies the reality of the higher elements to save the lower. Schiller uses the term "pseudo metaphysical" here instead of naturalism—as he sometimes does—because he is accusing these naturalist philosophers of trying to solve metaphysical problems while sticking to the non metaphysical "lower" aspects of the world (i. e. without engaging in real metaphysics):
The pseudo metaphysical method puts forward the method of science as the method of philosophy. But it is doomed to perpetual failure. [T]he data supplied by the physical sciences are intractable, because they are data of a lower sort than the facts they are to explain. The objects of the physical sciences form the lower orders in the hierarchy of existence, more extensive but less significant. Thus the atoms of the physicist may indeed be found in the organisation of conscious beings, but they are subordinate: a living organism exhibits actions which cannot be formulated by the laws of physics alone; man is material, but he is also a great deal more. To show that the world's higher elements do not reduce to the lower is not yet to show that naturalism must condemn the world's higher elements as illusionary. A second component to Schiller's attack is showing that naturalism cannot escape its inability to reduce the higher to the lower by asserting that these higher elements evolve from the lower. However, Schiller does not see naturalism as any more capable of explaining the evolution of the higher from the lower than it is capable of reducing the higher to the lower. While evolution does begin with something lower that in turn evolves into something higher, the problem for naturalism is that whatever the starting point for evolution is, it must first be something with the potential to evolve into a higher. For example, the world cannot come into existence from nothing because the potential or "germ" of the world is not "in" nothing (nothing has no potential, it has nothing; after all, it is nothing). Likewise, biological evolution cannot begin from inanimate matter, because the potential for life is not "in" inanimate matter. The following passage shows Schiller applying the same sort of reasoning to the evolution of consciousness:
Taken as the type of the pseudo metaphysical method, which explains the higher by the lower it does not explain the genesis of consciousness out of unconscious matter, because we cannot, or do not, attribute potential consciousness to matter. the theory of Evolution derives the [end result] from its germ, i. e., from that which was, what it became, potentially. Unable to either reduce or explain the evolution of the higher elements of our world, naturalism is left to explain away the higher elements as mere illusions. In doing this, naturalism condemns us to scepticism in both epistemology and ethics. It is worth noting, that while Schiller's work has been largely neglected since his death, Schiller's arguments against a naturalistic account of evolution have been recently cited by advocates of intelligent design to establish the existence of a longer history for the view due to legal concerns in the United States (See: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District).
Рассматриваемый как тип псевдометафизического метода, который объясняет высшее низшим, он не объясняет генезис сознания из бессознательной материи, потому что мы не можем или не хотим приписывать материи потенциальное сознание. Теория эволюции выводит [конечный результат] из его зародыша, то есть из того, чем оно было потенциально. Неспособный ни свести, ни объяснить эволюцию высших элементов нашего мира, натурализм вынужден объявлять высшие элементы простыми иллюзиями. Делая это, натурализм обрекает нас на скептицизм как в эпистемологии, так и в этике. Стоит отметить, что, хотя работы Шиллера в значительной степени игнорировались после его смерти, аргументы Шиллера против натуралистического объяснения эволюции были недавно процитированы сторонниками разумного замысла для установления более длительной истории этой точки зрения из-за юридических проблем в Соединенных Штатах (См.: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District).
the reference to Time could not, of course, be recovered, any more than the individuality of Reality can be deduced, when once ignored. The assumption is made that, to express the 'truth' about Reality, its 'thisness,' individuality, change and its immersion in a certain temporal and spatial environment may be neglected, and the timeless validity of a conception is thus substituted for the living, changing and perishing existence we contemplate. What I wish here to point out is merely that it is unreasonable to expect from such premises to arrive at a deductive justification of the very characteristics of Reality that have been excluded. The true reason, then, why Hegelism can give no reason for the Time process, i. e. for the fact that the world is 'in time,' and changes continuously, is that it was constructed to give an account of the world irrespective of time and change. If you insist on having a system of eternal and immutable 'truth,' you can get it only by abstracting from those characteristics of reality, which we try to express by the terms individuality, time, and change. But you must pay the price for a formula that will enable you to make assertions that hold good far beyond the limits of your experience. And it is part of the price that you will in the end be unable to give a rational explanation of those very characteristics, which you dismissed at the outset as irrelevant to a rational explanation. While abstract metaphysics provides us with a world of beauty and purpose and various other "highers", it condemns other key aspects of the world we live in as imaginary. The world of abstract metaphysics has no place for imperfect moral agents who (1) strive to learn about the world and then (2) act upon the world to change it for the better. Consequently, abstract metaphysics condemns us as illusionary, and declares our place in the world as unimportant and purposeless. Where abstractions take priority, our concrete lives collapse into scepticism and pessimism. He also makes a case against the alternative naturalist method, saying that this too results in an epistemological and moral scepticism. Schiller looks to show this method's inadequacy at moving from the cold, lifeless lower world of atoms to the higher world of ethics, meanings, and minds. As with abstract metaphysics, Schiller attacks naturalism on many fronts: (1) the naturalist method is unable to reduce universals to particulars, (2) the naturalist method is unable to reduce freewill to determinist movements, (3) the naturalist method is unable to reduce emergent properties like consciousness to brain activity, (4) the naturalist method is unable to reduce God into a pantheism, and so on. Just as the abstract method cannot find a place for the lower elements of our world inside the higher, the naturalist method cannot find a place for the higher elements of our world inside the lower. In a reversal of abstract metaphysics, naturalism denies the reality of the higher elements to save the lower. Schiller uses the term "pseudo metaphysical" here instead of naturalism—as he sometimes does—because he is accusing these naturalist philosophers of trying to solve metaphysical problems while sticking to the non metaphysical "lower" aspects of the world (i. e. without engaging in real metaphysics):
The pseudo metaphysical method puts forward the method of science as the method of philosophy. But it is doomed to perpetual failure. [T]he data supplied by the physical sciences are intractable, because they are data of a lower sort than the facts they are to explain. The objects of the physical sciences form the lower orders in the hierarchy of existence, more extensive but less significant. Thus the atoms of the physicist may indeed be found in the organisation of conscious beings, but they are subordinate: a living organism exhibits actions which cannot be formulated by the laws of physics alone; man is material, but he is also a great deal more. To show that the world's higher elements do not reduce to the lower is not yet to show that naturalism must condemn the world's higher elements as illusionary. A second component to Schiller's attack is showing that naturalism cannot escape its inability to reduce the higher to the lower by asserting that these higher elements evolve from the lower. However, Schiller does not see naturalism as any more capable of explaining the evolution of the higher from the lower than it is capable of reducing the higher to the lower. While evolution does begin with something lower that in turn evolves into something higher, the problem for naturalism is that whatever the starting point for evolution is, it must first be something with the potential to evolve into a higher. For example, the world cannot come into existence from nothing because the potential or "germ" of the world is not "in" nothing (nothing has no potential, it has nothing; after all, it is nothing). Likewise, biological evolution cannot begin from inanimate matter, because the potential for life is not "in" inanimate matter. The following passage shows Schiller applying the same sort of reasoning to the evolution of consciousness:
Taken as the type of the pseudo metaphysical method, which explains the higher by the lower it does not explain the genesis of consciousness out of unconscious matter, because we cannot, or do not, attribute potential consciousness to matter. the theory of Evolution derives the [end result] from its germ, i. e., from that which was, what it became, potentially. Unable to either reduce or explain the evolution of the higher elements of our world, naturalism is left to explain away the higher elements as mere illusions. In doing this, naturalism condemns us to scepticism in both epistemology and ethics. It is worth noting, that while Schiller's work has been largely neglected since his death, Schiller's arguments against a naturalistic account of evolution have been recently cited by advocates of intelligent design to establish the existence of a longer history for the view due to legal concerns in the United States (See: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District).