Колумбия и США: Эволюция отношений и стратегическое партнерство.

The relationship between Colombia and the United States evolved from a mutual cordiality during the 19th and early 20th centuries to a recent partnership that links the governments of both nations around several key issues; this includes fighting communism, the War on Drugs, and the threat of terrorism due to the September 11 attacks in 2001. During the last fifty years, different American governments and their representatives have become involved in Colombian affairs through the implementation of policies concerned with the issues already stated. Some critics of current US policies in Colombia, such as Law Professor John Barry, claim that US influences have catalyzed internal conflicts and substantially expanded the scope and nature of human rights abuses in Colombia. Supporters, such as Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, defend the idea that the United States has promoted respect for human rights and the rule of law in Colombia; in addition, adding to the fight against drugs and terrorism. A signing member of the Rio Pact and SICOFAA, as well as a regular participant in RIMPAC, Colombia was notably the only South American nation to support the US led Iraq War of 2003. The Colombian government also strongly condemned the nuclear tests of North Korea in 2006, 2009, and 2013, resolved to send soldiers to Afghanistan to aid the International Security Assistance Force in their ongoing struggle with the Taliban, joined the West and its allies in recognizing Kosovo, and, in voting in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 officially supported foreign military intervention in the Libyan Civil War. Upon the death of Osama bin Laden, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos congratulated Obama, stating in a press release that the raid "proves once again that terrorists, sooner or later, always fall. In the global fight against terrorism there is only one way: to persevere, persevere and persevere." As of 2013, Colombia has expressed its aspirations to eventually join the U. S. led NATO military alliance. President Juan Manuel Santos stated, "In June, NATO will sign an agreement with the Colombian government, with the Defense Ministry, to start the process of rapprochement and cooperation, with an eye toward also joining that organization." In response, US assistant secretary of state Roberta Jacobson noted, "Our goal is certainly to support Colombia as being a capable and strong member of lots of different international organizations, and that might well include NATO." According to the 2012 U. S. Global Leadership Report, 47% of Colombians approve of U. S. leadership, with 23% of the people disapproving and 29% remaining percentage uncertain; the sixth highest rating of the U. S. for any surveyed country in the Americas. In a survey in 2015, the image of President Obama's favorability was 78% among Colombians.

During the Spanish American wars of independence, the United States was officially neutral but permitted Spanish American agents to obtain weapons and supplies. With the reception of Manuel Torres in 1821, Colombia became the first "former" Spanish colony recognized by the United States, and the United States was the second government (after the Kingdom of Brazil) to recognize an independent Spanish American state. At that time, Gran Colombia included the territory of the present day Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama. Mutual relations have existed since the U. S. established a diplomatic mission in Santa Fe de Bogota in 1823. The next year the Anderson–Gual Treaty became the first bilateral treaty the U. S. concluded with another American country. U. S. relations with the government in Bogotá were not interrupted even when Ecuador and Venezuela left the federation in 1830. In 1846, the U. S. Polk administration signed a treaty with Colombia, which owned Panama at the time. A railway across the isthmus was opened in 1855. Under the treaty, U. S. troops landed in Panama six times in the nineteenth century to crush rebellions, ensuring that the railway was not hindered.

In 1903, the U. S. and Colombia negotiated a new treaty. The representative of the company which owned the railway publicly predicted and threatened that Panama would secede if the Colombian Senate rejected the treaty. In 1903, despite U. S. threats, the Colombian senate refused to ratify the Hay–Herrán Treaty. A representative of the new Panamanian government then negotiated a treaty favorable to the U. S. for the construction and operation of the Panama Canal. In 1928, U. S. business interests were threatened in Colombia. The workers of the U. S. corporation United Fruit banana plantations in Colombia went on strike in December 1928. The workers demanded "written contracts, eight hour days, six day weeks and the elimination of food coupons". After several weeks without an agreement, an army regiment from Bogotá was brought in by the Colombian government of Miguel Abadía Méndez to crush the strike. The soldiers erected their machine guns on the roofs of buildings at the corners of the main square in Ciénaga, Magdalena, closing off the access streets. After a five minute warning, they ordered "Fuego! ", opening fire into a dense crowd of plantation workers and their families who had gathered after Sunday Mass. between forty seven to 2,000 workers were killed in the Santa Marta Massacre. A populist Colombian congressman, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, began to develop a nationwide reputation, especially among the poor, after visiting the site of the United Fruit massacre the same week. Gaitán returned to Bogotá and argued passionately in Congress in favor of the workers, arguing that the army’s actions did not protect Colombia's interests but instead those of the U. S.

In 1948, presidential candidate Gaitàn was assassinated in Bogotá during the conference that gave birth to the Organization of American States. Gaitan's assassination marked the beginning of La Violencia, a Colombian civil war which lasted until the mid fifties and killed an estimated 300,000 Colombians. Towards the end of the conflict, Liberal and Communist armed peasant groups who remained at large, together with displaced peasants who had either fled from the violence or lost their land, formed small independent enclaves in the south. According to author Stokes, citing Jenny Pearce, these enclaves had "no broader political project" other than agriculture and self protection. The Colombian government, pressured by Conservative Congressmen who defined these enclaves as "independent republics", saw this as a potential threat. In addition, the U. S. government saw these peasant enclaves as potentially dangerous to U. S. business interests in Colombia. In May 1964, as part of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, a CIA backed program called Plan LAZO was initiated. The United States trained Colombian military troops to invade the largest peasant enclaves. They used a bomber aircraft with Napalm in order to destroy the threat. Many of the armed inhabitants of the enclaves escaped and two years later part of this group formed the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The FARC became the oldest and largest revolutionary "guerilla" movement (guerilla referring to insurgent militias inspired by the Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese revolutions) in the Western Hemisphere. Stokes and other critics believed that the U. S. government focused on the destruction of the FARC and other left wing guerrilla movements, ignoring and even supporting other destabilizing elements in Colombian society.

As La Violencia was ending a "U. S. Special Survey Team" composed of worldwide counterinsurgency experts arrived in October 1959 to investigate Colombia's internal security. Among other policy recommendations the U. S. team advised that "in order to shield the interests of both Colombian and U. S. authorities against 'interventionist' charges any special aid given for internal security was to be sterile and covert in nature." This recommendation is a form of plausible deniability, common in secret U. S. government documents which are later declassified. In February 1962, three years after the 1959 "U. S. Special Survey Team", a Fort Bragg top level U. S. Special Warfare team headed by Special Warfare Center commander General William P. Yarborough visited Colombia for a second survey. In a secret supplement to his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Yarborough encouraged a stay behind irregular force and its immediate deployment to eliminate communists representing a future threat:

"A concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian internal security system deteriorates further. This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter agent and counter propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States If we have such an apparatus in Colombia it should be employed now." Interrogation procedures and techniques, including regular questioning of rural villagers "who are believed to be knowledgeable of guerrilla activities" were advised. "Exhaustive interrogation of the bandits, to include sodium pentathol and polygraph, should be used to elicit every shred of information. Both the Army and the Police need trained interrogators." The use of truth serum would later be encouraged in SOA manuals. This new counter insurgency policy debuted with Plan LAZO in 1964. Because of the decree, eleven separate civilian intelligence networks had been established with agricultural co operatives.