История французских железных дорог: от истоков до национализации.

The history of rail transport in France dates from the first French railway in 1823 to present day enterprises such as the AGV.

The 1842 agreement, designed by Adolphe Thiers, The Thiers Plan adopted in 1842 called for the state to contribute about $50,000 per mile and own the system. Private companies spend about $40,000 per mile for track, equipment, buildings, locomotives, and cars. The government further subsidized the companies by having the department of the Ponts et Chaussées do most of the planning and engineering work for new lines. The government would assist in securing the land, often by expropriation. The government also agreed to pay infrastructure costs, building bridges, tunnels, and track bed. The private companies would then furnish the tracks, stations and rolling stock, as well as pay the operating costs. The policy was confusing and contradictory, and blocked monopolies, which meant no regional networks could form. This general policy masked many exceptions and additions. The most successful companies, especially the Chemins de fer du Nord, would often build their own lines themselves in order to avoid the complications of going through the government. For instance, during the economic boom period of the 1850s, the national government had to pay only 19 percent of the costs of railway construction. Other less successful lines, such as the Midi, would often need more assistance from the government to remain in operation. The same proved true during recessions, such as in 1859, when the railway lines gained a new agreement to save them from bankruptcy. In exchange for funding part of the construction of rail lines, the French government set maximum rates that the companies could charge. It also insisted that all government traffic must travel at a third of standard costs. The expectation that the government would eventually nationalize the rail system formed another important element in French railway legislation. The original agreement of 1842 leased the railway lines to the companies for only 36 years. Napoleon III extended these leases to 99 years soon after he came to power. That the rail companies only operated on leases paved the way for the nationalization of the French rail lines under the socialist government of the 1930s. When the Republic replaced the monarchy in 1848, 2000 miles of track were in operation but the situation was highly unsatisfactory. Three dozen companies were in operation, most of them with incomplete lines that sharply limited traffic. Financially, most were in great distress. Moving passengers are freight from one plane to another was quite difficult, and everyone called for radical reforms but no legislation was passed. The concession for the Strasbourg–Basel railway was granted to the Compagnie du chemin de fer de Strasbourg à Bâle, founded by the Koechlin brothers, in 1838. The railway was opened in 1840–1844.

When Napoleon III turned his presidency into an imperial role, he gained almost dictatorial powers and made completion of a good working system a high priority. The first step was to amalgamate all the companies along specific routes. The consolidation into six major companies proved successful. By 1857 the consolidation was complete, and the government was no longer operating any lines. All the trunk lines were interconnected. The original plan of using Paris as a hub was continued, so that long distance travel from one place to another necessitated connecting to another line in Paris. Paris grew dramatically in terms of population, industry, finance, commercial activity, and tourism. The worldwide commercial crisis of 1857–58 delayed financing and construction for a brief while, but the financing for all six companies was solidified by government guarantees. The original vision from 1842 of a grant national network was largely realized. The system was virtually complete by 1870, although constant construction was done to upgrade the quality of lines, set up double trackage, rebuild bridges, Improve signaling, and large freight yards and passenger stations, reduce slopes and drill long tunnels.

The railway construction was such a grand project, and it showed in such dramatic effects in Great Britain, the leading financiers, industrialists, and technicians competed vigorously for the place, all under the Emperor's watchful eye. Key players included the brothers Isaac Pereire and Emile Pereire, Auguste de Morny, Paulin Talabot, and—richest of them all—James de Rothschild. In the battle for control of a line from Paris to the Mediterranean, Talabot, with Rothschild support, won, besting the Pereire brothers. In 1853, Morny floated the idea of a Grand Central Railroad. By 1857 it became the scheme for six major monopolistic networks in six regions: North (Nord), East (Est), West (Ouest), PLM, Orleans, and Southern (Midi). The Government gave 99 year leases, and gave continuing subsidies, and return for heavily subsidized or free government movements. The six were required to build feeder networks locally.

The first completed lines radiated out of Paris, connecting France's major cities to the capital. These lines still form the backbone of the French railway system. By the 1860s, workers had completed the basic structure of the network, but they continued to build many minor lines during the late 19th century to fill in the gaps. By 1855, the many original small firms had coalesced into six large companies, each having a regional monopoly in one area of France. The Nord, Est, Ouest, Paris Orléans, Paris Lyon Méditerranée (PLM), and the Midi lines divided the nation into strict corridors of control. Difficulties arose in that the six large monopolies, with the exception of the Midi Company, all connected to Paris, but did not link together anywhere else in the country. The French railway map comprised a series of unconnected branches running out of Paris. While this meant that trains served Paris well, other parts of the country were not served as well. For instance, one branch of the Paris Orléans Line ended in Clermont Ferrand, while Lyon stood on the PLM Line. Thus any goods or passengers requiring transportation from Lyon to Clermont Ferrand in 1860 needed to take a circuitous route via Paris of over seven hundred kilometers, even though a mere hundred and twenty kilometers separated the two cities. This centering on Paris led to inefficiency in the Franco Prussian War (1870–1871). The Prusso German railway lines, inter connected in a grid like fashion, proved far more efficient at advancing troops and supplies to the front than the French one. The arrangement of the lines also hurt France's economy. Shipping costs between regional centers became greatly inflated. Thus many cities specialized in exporting their goods to Paris, as trans shipment to a second city would double the price. France lagged behind German building following the unification of Germany in 1871. France ended up with this arrangement for a number of reasons. Paris formed the undisputed capital of France, and many viewed it as the capital of Europe. To French railway planners, it seemed only natural that all the lines should involve the metropolis. By contrast, Germany ended up with a far superior system because it had little unity and many centers vying for preeminence. Thus a variety of rail centers arose. Berlin, Munich, Dresden, Hamburg, and the Rhine areas all had links to each other. By 1900, German preeminence was obvious and factored into the growing hostility toward Germany in France. By 1914 the French railway system had become one of the densest and most highly developed in the world, and had reached its maximum extent of around About one third of this mileage comprised narrow gauge lines. Following 1918, France received significant additions to its locomotive and wagon fleet as part of the reparations from Germany required by the Versailles Treaty. In addition, the network of the Imperial Railways in Alsace Lorraine was taken over by France when the Alsace Lorraine region, which had been under German control since the Franco Prussian War, was returned to France.

Railway freight rates fell steadily from 14.5 (centimes per ton kilometer 0 and 1841–1844, 28.7 and 1855–1864, then slowly 25.4 in 1905–1913. Meanwhile, freight rates on the roads held steady at about 25. The rapid pace of industrialization in the growth of national markets dramatically increased the tonnage carried. In 1845, the railways carried 102 million ton kilometers; by 1850, the total had quadrupled to 423 million. By 1855 it reached 1,530 million, in 1860, 3,140 million.

By the 1930s, competition from motor vehicles took its toll on the railways, and the rail network needed pruning. The narrow gauge lines suffered most severely from road competition; many thousands of miles of narrow gauge lines closed during the 1930s. By the 1950s the once extensive narrow gauge system had practically become extinct. Many minor standard gauge lines also closed. The French railway system today has around of track. Many of the private railway operating companies began to face financial difficulties. In 1938 the socialist government fully nationalised the railway system and formed the Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais (SNCF). Regional authorities have begun to specify schedules since the mid of the 1970s with general conventions between the regions and the SNCF since the mid 1980s. From 1981 onwards, a newly constructed set of high speed TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse) lines linked France's most populated areas with the capital, starting with Paris Lyon. In 1994, the Channel Tunnel opened, connecting France and Great Britain by rail under the English Channel.