Конвенция о биологическом оружии: история и современность

1975 treaty that comprehensively bans biological weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), or Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), is a disarmament treaty that effectively bans biological and toxin weapons by prohibiting their development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use. The treaty's full name is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. As of February 2023, 185 states have become party to the treaty. The BWC is considered to have established a strong global norm against biological weapons. This norm is reflected in the treaty's preamble, which states that the use of biological weapons would be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind". It is also demonstrated by the fact that not a single state today declares to possess or seek biological weapons, or asserts that their use in war is legitimate. In light of the rapid advances in biotechnology, biodefense expert Daniel Gerstein has described the BWC as "the most important arms control treaty of the twenty first century". However, the convention's effectiveness has been limited due to insufficient institutional support and the absence of any formal verification regime to monitor compliance.

While the history of biological warfare goes back more than six centuries to the Siege of Caffa in 1346 CE, international restrictions on biological warfare began only with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use but not the possession or development of chemical and biological weapons. Upon ratification of the Geneva Protocol, several countries made reservations regarding its applicability and use in retaliation. Due to these reservations, it was in practice a "no first use" agreement only. In particular, it did not prevent multiple states from starting and scaling offensive biological weapons programs, including the United States (active from 1943 to 1969) and the Soviet Union (active from the 1920s until at least 1992). The American biowarfare system was terminated in 1969 by President Nixon when he issued his Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs. The statement ended, unconditionally, all U. S. offensive biological weapons programs. When Nixon ended the program the budget was $300 million annually. The BWC sought to supplement the Geneva Protocol and was negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva from 1969 to 1972, following the conclusion of the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Of significance was a 1968 British proposal to separate consideration of chemical and biological weapons and to first negotiate a convention on biological weapons. The negotiations gained further momentum when the United States decided to unilaterally end its offensive biological weapons program in 1969 and support the British proposal. The final negotiation stage was reached when the United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical but separate drafts of the BWC text on 5 August 1971.]] With only 15 articles, the BWC is relatively short. Over time, the treaty has been interpreted and supplemented by additional politically binding agreements and understandings reached by its States Parties at eight subsequent Review Conferences.

Article I: Never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain biological weapons. Article II: To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated resources prior to joining. Article III: Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage, or induce anyone else to acquire or retain biological weapons. Article IV: To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC domestically. Article V: Undertaking to consult bilaterally and multilaterally and cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective, or in the application, of the BWC. Article VI: Right to request the United Nations Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC and undertaking to cooperate in carrying out any investigation initiated by the Security Council. Article VII: To assist States which have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the BWC. Article X: Undertaking to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and information for peaceful purposes. The remaining articles concern the BWC's compatibility with the 1925 Geneva Protocol (Article VIII), negotiations to prohibit chemical weapons (Article IX), amendments (Article XI), Review Conferences (Article XII), duration (Article XIII, 1), withdrawal (Article XIII, 2), joining the convention, depositary governments, and conditions for entry into force (Article XIV, 1–5), and languages (Article XV).

Article V requires States Parties to consult one another and cooperate in disputes concerning the purpose or implementation of the BWC. and the second in 2022 at the request of the Russian Federation.

Article VI allows States Parties to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council if they suspect a breach of treaty obligations by another state. One formal complaint pursuant to Article VI has been lodged by the Russian Federation in 2022.

Article VII obliges States Parties to provide assistance to states that so request it if the UN Security Council decides they have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the BWC. Despite no state ever having invoked Article VII, the article has drawn more attention in recent years, in part due to increasing evidence of terrorist organizations being interested in acquiring biological weapons and also following various naturally occurring epidemics.

Article X protects States Parties' right to exchange biological materials, technology, and information to be used for peaceful purposes.

The BWC has 185 States Parties as of February 2023, with South Sudan the most recent to become a party. Four states have signed but not ratified the treaty: Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, and Syria. Eight additional states have neither signed nor acceded to the treaty: Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, and Tuvalu. and the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with 191 parties. States can join the BWC through either ratification, accession or succession, in accordance with their national constitutional processes, which often require parliamentary approval. Ratification applies to states which had previously signed the treaty before it entered into force in 1975.]] At the Second Review Conference in 1986, BWC States Parties agreed to strengthen the treaty by exchanging annual confidence building measures (CBMs). These politically binding reports aim to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and at improving international cooperation on peaceful biological activities.

Unlike the chemical or nuclear weapons regimes, the BWC lacks both a system to verify states' compliance with the treaty and a separate international organization to support the convention's effective implementation. During four meetings in 1992 and 1993, VEREX considered 21 verification measures, including inspections of facilities, monitoring relevant publications, and other on site and off site measures. Another stimulus came from the successful negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which opened for signature in 1993. The Ad Hoc Group convened 24 sessions between 1995 and 2001, during which it negotiated a draft protocol to the BWC which would establish an international organization and introduce a verification system. However, at the 24th session of the Ad Hoc Group in July 2001 the George W. Bush administration rejected both the draft protocol circulated by the Group's Chairman and the entire approach on which the draft was based, resulting in the collapse of the negotiation process. Many analysts, including Matthew Meselson and Amy Smithson, criticized the U. S. decision as undermining international efforts against non proliferation and as contradicting U. S. government rhetoric regarding the alleged biological weapons threat posed by Iraq and other U. S. adversaries. In subsequent years, calls for restarting negotiations on a verification protocol have been repeatedly voiced. For instance, during the 2019 Meeting of Experts "several States Parties stressed the urgency of resuming multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non discriminatory, legally binding instrument dealing with ( ) verification measures". However, since "some States Parties did not support the negotiation of a protocol to the BWC" it seems "neither realistic nor practicable to return to negotiations". In December 2022, States Parties decided to establish a Working Group on strengthening the Convention, which aims to address among other issues, measures on verification and compliance.

A number of BWC States Parties have been accused of breaching the convention's obligations by developing or producing biological weapons. Because of the intense secrecy around biological weapons programs, Around the time when the BWC negotiations were finalized, and the treaty was signed in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union significantly expanded its covert biological weapons program under the oversight of the "civilian" institution Biopreparat within the Soviet Ministry of Health. The Soviet program employed up to 65,000 people in several hundred facilities The Soviet authorities blamed the outbreak on the consumption of contaminated meat and for years denied any connection between the incident and biological weapons research. However, investigations concluded that the outbreak was caused by an accident at a nearby military microbiology facility, resulting in the escape of an aerosol of anthrax pathogen. Supporting this finding, Russian President Boris Yeltsin later admitted that "our military developments were the cause". Western concerns about Soviet compliance with the BWC increased during the late 1980s and were supported by information provided by several defectors, including Vladimir Pasechnik and Ken Alibek. The agreement's objective was to uncover details about the Soviet's biological weapons program and to verify that all related activities had truly been terminated.

Starting around 1985 under Saddam Hussein's leadership, Iraq weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and other agents, and created delivery vehicles, including bombs, missile warheads, aerosol generators, and spray systems.

There are several reasons why biological weapons are especially difficult to verify. First, in contrast to chemical and nuclear weapons, even small initial quantities of biological agents can be used to quickly produce militarily significant amounts. Second, biotechnological equipment and even dangerous pathogens and toxins cannot be prohibited altogether since they also have legitimate peaceful or defensive purposes, including the development of vaccines and medical therapies. BWC States Parties agreed at the Meeting of States Parties in 2018, which was cut short due to funding shortfalls, on a package of remedial financial measures including the establishment of a Working Capital Fund. This fund is financed by voluntary contributions and provides short term financing in order to ensure the continuity of approved programs and activities.